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CLD-351        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2107 
___________ 
 
JON BAUMGARDNER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID J. EBBERT, Warden, FMC; MR. RILEY, Health Service Officer;  
MR. LAINO, Health Service Administrator; DEBRA SPOTTS, Former Assistant Health 
Service Administrator;  MR. SIMONSON, Medical Officer; JAY MILLER,  
Medical Officer; DAVID J. BALL, Contracted Surgeon; MICKI POWAND,  
Physicians Assistant; BOP Officer JOHN DOE; BOP Officer RICHARD ROE;  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS and various additional unknown  
agents and employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 4:10-cv-01459) 
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon, Junior 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 25, 2013 
 
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 12, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 
 Appellant Jon Baumgardner appeals the District Court’s order granting 
defendants’ motions to dismiss and motion for summary judgment.  For the reasons set 
forth below, will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
I. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Baumgardner is an inmate currently confined in the Federal 
Correctional Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania (“FCI-Allenwood”).  He filed this 
Bivens action against various FCI-Allenwood medical health service and staff employees 
(the “BOP Defendants”), as well Dr. David J. Ball, a private orthopedic surgeon, alleging 
mistreatment and deliberate indifference, inter alia, in connection with the treatment of 
his ruptured Achilles tendon, which he injured in June 2008 while playing basketball in 
the outside recreation yard.  After the incident, Baumgardner was immediately taken to 
the medical department and treated by a nurse, who wrapped his foot, gave him crutches, 
and instructed him to elevate his foot and apply ice.  The next day, an x-ray was taken 
and an orthopedic consult for surgery was ordered.  Three days after the incident, Dr. Ball 
repaired Baumgardner’s Achilles tendon.  Thereafter, Baumgardner saw various medical 
professionals in connection with his injury.   
 3 
 
 In August 2008, Baumgardner was seen by a physician assistant at FCI-
Allenwood.  He complained of a burning sensation and numbness in his foot and heel and 
he asked for direction relating to rehabilitation.  After conferring with Dr. Ball, the 
physician assistant educated Baumgardner on stretching exercises.  According to Dr. 
Ball, at that time, Baumgardner was approximately eight weeks out from surgery and he 
was free to resume all normal activities.  About ten days later, Baumgardner saw Dr. Ball 
and was treated for heel pain.  He expressed concern about physical therapy.  Dr. Ball’s 
medical notes state:  “He did relate some disapproval of the fact that he did not get any 
physical therapy after his surgery. . . I showed him how to do stretching by going up a 
step.  I also told him he could use weights and a stationary bicycle for his stretching and 
strengthening.”  See Exhibit 2, Att. 2 to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary 
judgment at 37-38.  Dr. Ball further noted that other than some mild swelling, 
Baumgardner “otherwise had an excellent result with his Achilles tendon repair.”  Id.   
Again in September 2008, Baumgardner saw Dr. Ball, who recommended certain 
stretching exercises and encouraged him to use the stationary bike to increase his range of 
motion and strength.   
 Thereafter, there are numerous entries in Baumgardner’s medical records showing 
that he was treated for pain related to his Achilles injury, including treatment for hip pain, 
back pain, heel pain, and a wound at the incision site.  See Exhibit 2, Att. 2 to 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.  In November 2008, 
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Baumgardner had an x-ray of his hip, which was negative.  In December 2008, 
Baumgardner was examined for his continuing right hip and back pain and an MRI was 
ordered.  The MRI was completed in February 2009 and showed “some slight bilateral 
hip joint degenerative change,” but no fractures or bony destructive lesions.  Id. at p. 61.  
In March 2009, Baumgardner received a lumbar x-ray, which was negative.  As a result 
of continuous back pain, Baumgardner received another MRI in June 2009, which did not 
show anything.   From September 2009 through July 2010, Baumgardner was seen by 
medical staff at FCI-Allenwood for hip and back pain.  He received pain medication and 
heel pads for his shoes. 
 In July 2010, Baumgardner initiated this action.  He claims that the defendants 
knew of his condition, but failed to timely provide treatment.  He alleges that the medical 
staff was not properly trained, experienced, licensed, or qualified for their positions.  
Baumgardner alleges intentional mistreatment in violation of his rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to his medical 
condition in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, and retaliation by 
withholding privileges from inmates who complain in violation his rights under the First 
Amendment.  He also brought claims pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2671, et. seq. (“FTCA”), the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 
(“ADA”) and various state law claims.  Baumgardner submitted two affidavits outlining 
the facts surrounding his claims.  He claims that he was denied physical therapy, despite 
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numerous requests and filing a grievance.  He alleges that other inmates who have had 
Achilles tendon surgery performed by Dr. Ball have had physical therapy and have 
returned to normal physical activity.  The BOP Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and 
motion for summary judgment, and Dr. Ball filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to 
dismiss for failure to file a certificate of merit, all of which the District Court granted.  
This appeal followed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review of 
a district court’s order granting or denying summary judgment, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  See Tri–M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 
2011).  We will affirm only if “drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Id.  We also exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d 
Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We will affirm a district 
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim “only if, accepting all factual allegations as 
true and construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we 
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determine that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint.”  McGovern v. City of Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
may summarily affirm if the appeal does not present a substantial question, and may do 
so on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 Baumgardner claims that the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment.  However, there is nothing in the record to support such a claim.  In the 
context of Eighth Amendment claims based on medical care, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 
(1976).  “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  For instance, a plaintiff may make this showing by establishing that the 
defendants “intentionally den[ied] or delay[ed] medical care.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted).  However, “[w]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to 
second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort 
law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Baumgardner claims that the defendants violated his Eight Amendment rights by 
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not providing him with post-operative physical therapy.  He claims that inmates who had 
similar surgery received physical therapy and did not experience the pain he experienced. 
Even if these allegations are true, Baumgardner fails to adduce any evidence that the 
defendants had a sufficiently “culpable state of mind” when they treated him and, thus, he 
fails to state a claim for deliberate indifference.  See Singletary v. Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d 
Cir.1999) (“In the context of a deliberate indifference claim based on failure to provide 
adequate medical treatment, ‘[i]t is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical 
malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute ‘deliberate 
indifference.’”).  Viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Baumgardner, the record shows that he was provided pain medication and treatment after 
his injury and there is nothing in the record to suggest that Baumgardner was 
intentionally denied treatment in order to inflict pain. 
 Moreover, a prisoner’s disagreement with proper medical treatment does not 
imply a constitutional violation.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Here, Baumgardner argues that he should have been treated by a professional physical 
therapist.  The record shows, however, that Dr. Ball provided Baumgardner with stretches 
and exercises to perform to help his recovery.  The fact that these exercises were not 
prescribed by a physical therapist is irrelevant.  The record evidence shows that 
Baumgardner was treated for his injury and there is no evidence from which we can draw 
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a reasonable inference that the defendants consciously disregarded Baumgardner’s 
medical needs and delayed his treatment.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) 
(“the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.”); Kaucher 
v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 428 (3d Cir. 2006) (requiring “that a person 
consciously disregard ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’”).1 
 The record also does not support Baumgardner’s retaliation claim.  A prisoner 
litigating a retaliation claim must show that the conduct provoking the alleged retaliation 
was constitutionally protected, that he suffered some “adverse action” at the hands of the 
prison officials “sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
[constitutional] rights,” and that the constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial 
motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 
2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, Baumgardner 
alleges that the defendants withheld physical therapy as punishment and as a means to 
discourage complaints about inadequate medical treatment.  However, these allegations 
are vague, nonspecific statements that cannot withstand a motion to dismiss and there is 
                                              
1
 We agree with the District Court that the non-medical defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment for Baumgardner’s Eighth Amendment claim.  Correctional officials 
cannot be “considered deliberately indifferent simply because they failed to respond 
directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner who was already being treated by a 
prison doctor.”  Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (non-medical prison officials will not be charged 
with deliberate indifference absent a reason to believe or actual knowledge that medical 
staff are mistreating a prisoner). 
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no evidence in record to create an issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.
2
,
3
   
IV. 
 We agree with the District Court’s decision to dismiss Baumgardner’s FTCA 
claim for medical negligence because he failed to file a certificate of merit (“COM”).  
The FTCA requires a court to apply the tort laws of the state in which the alleged tort 
arose.  Gould Elec. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 2000).  Here, the 
alleged tort of medical malpractice occurred in Pennsylvania and Pennsylvania’s law 
applies.  Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice to file a 
COM.
4
  The certificate must attest either that an appropriate licensed professional 
supplied a written statement that there exists a reasonable probability that the care 
provided fell outside acceptable professional standards, or that expert testimony of an 
appropriate licensed professional is unnecessary.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a)(1) & (3).  This 
requirement is a substantive rule and applies even where, as here, the claim is brought in 
federal court.  See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 264–65 (3d Cir. 
2011).   
 Baumgardner did not file the required COM, nor did he make a substantial effort 
                                              
2
 Having had two opportunities to amend his complaint, we agree with the District Court 
that allowing Baumgardner to amend for a third time would be futile.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
3
 Similarly, Baumgardner has no valid cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. 
4
To the extent Baumgardner alleges that his claims are for ordinary negligence, rather 
than medical malpractice, we agree with the District Court that Baumgardner’s claim that 
his medical care providers failed to order some type of physical therapy is a 
claim for medical malpractice, requiring a certificate of merit.   
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to comply with the rule or provide a reasonable excuse for failing to do so.
5
  Accordingly, 
the District Court properly dismissed his FTCA malpractice claim.
6
,
7
 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
8
  
                                              
5
 We agree with the District Court that Baumgardner’s argument that requiring a COM at 
this stage of the litigation presents a great burden because prisoners do not have access to 
their medical records and files prior to discovery is not a sufficient excuse for failing to 
file a COM. 
6
 Baumgardner’s reliance upon Berman v. United States, 205 F.Supp.2d 362 (M.D. Pa. 
2002) to support his claim for medical negligence is misplaced, as the docket shows that 
the plaintiff in that case had an expert witness and, the issue of a COM did not arise.  
7
 We agree with the District Court that Baumdgardner’s remaining claims for violation of 
the ADA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and non-medical negligence claims, fail to state a cause of action.  The District 
Court also properly dismissed the unnamed defendants, John Doe and Richard Roe, for 
failure to serve.  See Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4(m). 
8
 In support of his appeal, Baumgardner argues that he has been proceeding without the 
benefit of discovery.  He argues that the defendants’ motions were filed before the Court 
held a Rule 26 conference and, thus, discovery was not open.  Notably, Baumgardner did 
not request a stay of decision on the summary judgment motion in order to seek 
discovery, nor did he serve any discovery requests or file any discovery related motions.  
While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) provides that “a party may not seek 
discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f),” 
Rule 26(f) states that “the parties must, as soon as practicable and in any event at least 
21 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 
16(b), confer to . . . develop a proposed discovery plan . . . .”  (emphasis added). Thus, 
Rule 26(f) does not require the parties to delay conferring until after a scheduling 
conference has been held or a scheduling order has been issued and Baumgardner was not 
precluded from conferring with his adversaries as required by Rule 26(f) to initiate the 
discovery process.  
